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STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
L Did the trial court err in awarding Gallegos5 attorneys5 fees under 
U.C.A., Section 78-27-56(1) where Lloyds prevailed in all or a 
substantial part in the defense of Gallegos5 various claims? (Issue 
preserved in the Record through Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs5 Motion for Attorney5s Fees and Costs, Rec. 326-331). 
Standard of Review: The challenge of a conclusion of law underlying the 
trial court's order is not accorded any deference, but is reviewed for correctness. 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness." No deference is given to a trial courts' legal conclusions which are 
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Wilcox 
v. CSXCorp.. 2003 UT 21, 70 P.3d 85; Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
CitvofSpringville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332; Warner v. DMG Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 
102, If 21, 20 P.3d 868, 874 (quoting Softsolutions v. Brigham Young Univ.. 2000 UT 46, 
112, 1 P.3d 1095). 
II. Did the trial court err in awarding Gallegos5 attorneys5 fees as 
consequential damages to a trespass claim? (Issue preserved in the 
Record through Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs5 Motion for 
Attorney5s Fees and Costs, Rec. 326-331). 
Standard of Review: The challenge of a conclusion of law underlying the 
trial court's order is not accorded any deference, but is reviewed for correctness. 
1 
"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness." No deference is given to a trial courts' legal conclusions which are 
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). Wilcox 
v. CSXCorp.. 2003 UT 21, 70 P.3d 85; Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. 
CitvofSpringville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in 
bad faith - Exceptions: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is from an award of attorneys fees to plaintiffs/appellees, Andrew and 
Joan Gallegos (collectively "Gallegos") and against defendants/appellants, James and 
Julie Lloyd ("Lloyds") following a two-day bench trial before Judge John Paul Kennedy 
conducted on June 27-28,2006. 
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The original Complaint, filed on August 6, 2004 by Gallegos against Lloyds and 
others, was for trespass, negligence and quiet title based on the construction by Lloyds of 
a residential building that encroached over and upon the adjoining un-occupied parcel 
owned by Gallegos. (Rec. 1-9) The fact of the encroachment was not contested by Lloyds 
in the litigation; rather, Lloyds contested the nature and amounts of damages allegedly 
caused by the encroachment. (Gallegos Trial Brief, Rec. 200; Lloyds Trial Brief, Rec. 
268) The encroachment is depicted on a plat created by Gallegos engineer and received 
as Trial Ex. 9 (attached hereto as Addendum A). 
After the completion of all discovery, approximately six weeks before the 
scheduled trial, Gallegos moved the court for permission to amend their Complaint to 
include a claim for punitive damages based upon an alleged wilfull diregard by Lloyds of 
the property rights of Gallegos. (Rec. 131-140) At a hearing on May 31,2006, the trial 
court granted Gallegos' Motion over the opposition of Lloyds and the other defendants, 
and postponed the trial two weeks until June 28, 2006. (Rec. 205-206) 
At the close of a two-day bench trial, Judge Kennedy awarded consequential 
damages in favor of Gallegos in amounts significantly less than those requested by 
Gallegos before and during trial. The trial court further refused to find that the conduct of 
Lloyds rose to the level allowing him to grant punitive damages. Nevertheless, the court 
did make a general award of attorneys fees in favor of Gallegos in the alternative form of 
either additional consequential damages or attorneys fees recoverable for bad faith 
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defense under Utah Code § 78-27-56. (Transcript, Rec. 237 at page 7) The trial court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree included such award 
and were entered in July 19, 2006. (Rec. 305-316; 317-319) 
On July 19,2006, Gallegos filed a Motion for Attorneys Fee (Rec. 288-290) which 
was opposed by a memorandum filed by Lloyds on July 27, 2006. (Rec. 326-331) The 
Motion was heard by Judge Kennedy on November 2, 2006, and was granted with a 
minor decrease in the amounts of fees and costs requested in the Supplemental Judgement 
issued by Judge Kennedy on November 15, 2006. (Rec. 370-372) 
This appeal is from the awards of attorneys fees granted in both the July 19, 2006 
Judgment and Decree and the November 15, 2006 Supplemental Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When it Awarded Gallegos Attorney Fees as 
Consequential Damages for its Trespass Claim. 
The proper measure of damages under a trespass claim is "the diminished market 
value of the property plus consequential losses to the use of the land or from discomfort 
or annoyance" to the owner of the property. Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil 
Company, 972 P2d 1238, 1246 (Utah 1998). The parties have yet discovered no case, 
Utah or otherwise, in which attorneys fees were awarded as consequential damages 
resultant from a permanent trespass similar to the present case. 
In Utah and virtually every other state, "attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless 
provided for by statute or by contract." B & R Supply Company v. Bringhurst 503 P.2d 
4 
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1216, 1217 (Utah 1972); accord, 22 Am. Jur. 2nd § 430 at 483. The reasons for the 
general acceptance of this "American Rule" is that "since litigation is at best uncertain, 
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the 
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting an action to vindicate their rights if 
the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel." Fleishmann 
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Similarly, a trial court 
cannot award attorney's fees to a prevailing party as the consequential damages of a tort 
"because [legal fees] are not the legitimate consequence of the tort " Taxpayers for 
Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy Dist. 739 F.2d 
1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1984). 
The trial court clearly erred as a matter of law in awarding Gallegos their 
attorney's fees as consequential damages. Any holding to the contrary "would constitute a 
substantial abridgment of the American rule, to which Utah courts have [until now] 
demonstrated strong allegiance." Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean. 213 F.3d 
1301, 1317 (10* Cir. 2000). 
II. The Trial Court Erred when it Concluded that the Lloyds' Defenses to 
the Gallegos' Claim for Damages Were Without Merit and in Bad 
Faith. 
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code allows a court to award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines "that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought in good faith." Very early in the litigation discovery 
487233 1 
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proceedings, Lloyds discovered and acknowledged that a trespass had occurred. No 
contest or affirmative defense was ever made by Lloyds to that assertion. On May 31, 
2006, four weeks before trial, Judge Kennedy granted Gallegos' Motion to Amend 
Complaint and assert a claim for punitive damages. The entire litigation was directed to 
the appropriate measure of damages to be paid to Gallegos as caused by said trespass and 
the propriety of the claim for punitive damages. 
At the close of trial, the Court (1) found total damages in the amount of 
$72,053.31 - an amount significantly reduced from the amount plead in Gallegos' 
Amended Complaint and Trial Brief- and (2) declared that it "could not find by clear and 
convincing evidence that Lloyds had acted willfully, maliciously, or in an intentionally 
fraudulent manner, or with a knowing and reckless disregard for the rights of others." 
An asserted claim or defense cannot be meritless or "frivolous" if, after asserting that 
claim or defense, the party prevails, even partially. Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams. 
2005 UT App. at % 19, 122 P.3d at 149. 
A court "shall award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). Thus, according to the plain 
language of the statute, the bad faith requirement is linked to the phrase "action or 
defense" by the conjunction "and," thereby indicating the Legislature's intent to limit 
instances of bad faith to conduct linked to an "action or defense." The 10th Circuit Court 
487233 1 
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in ; ^rganroth & Morganroth v. UeLorea;.. - ; 18 (2000), declared that 
"Utan .ikelv would agree A •" • -.- u^ a' federal authority' 'limiting its consideration 
. ., ..:. . :ondi ict within the litigation, "rather than substantia;*. .:. .iiu \ * 
* '-Tmitting its courts to award attorney ^ i cc i r :ui related ;e die 
litigation process itself," 
F A I i.t^iAA^Wi i'O ISSUES ON APPEAL 
• Heiios purchased 1 * r i 02 (approximately 1 - .«. J ^ ':n*nt of 
building their family residence thereon. (Findings H -« I"" •"« 307) Gallegos initiaiiv 
retained, the semces of an arcluteti !* • iltM '^i: »hr home, but the plans were not finalized 
nor the construction commas"» d -if that time. 
In 1996, "' &> purciu^cd *hc adjoining Lot U)h (apnmvnuai* I I I i\ MTCSJ to 
.
 Qic-r family residence. (Finding-' -- ionee was completed in 
1997. (Findings t IV, K.L 
hi laic Ji)0 ; (-•.i..,-. 'osumed their plans to build a home on I oi I • i* • 
recomniissioned their designer, and commenced work towanl nhtammg permits and plans 
for their home (Gallegos Trial BneU Kec, -01 i i dm iwet\ in March of 2004, during the 
engineering researc;- . •. : • -»vd that three points of the Lloyd home, as 
constructed, enc * v.J uvoi and upon the boundary of T ot 1 . , . < • • • • ; • 
With existing set back requirements, the technica. . •• ^- • - ~. =r to i s feet in 
some places, (Gallegos Bno:, KCL 
487233.1 
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On August 6, 2004, Gallegos filed the Complaint commencing this action. (Rec. 1-
9) Gallegos thereafter purchased another Lot elsewhere in the general area upon which 
their home plans for 102 would not work, obtained new plans and built a new home. 
Gallegos' abandonment of Lot 102 and the plans for a home to be built thereon eventually 
resulted in damage to the Gallegos in the form of wasted architectural fees and storage 
costs (for the delay in construction). (Gallegos Trial Brief, Rec. 201) 
Lloyds did not contest the existence of the physical encroachment of their 
residence upon the Gallegos' property or the fact that such encroachment constituted a 
trespass. (Rec. 200, 268) The only issues which were disputed by the parties throughout 
the pre-trial litigation (up to May 31, 2006), were related to the nature and extent of the 
damages incurred by Gallegos as a result of Lloyds' encroachment (Rec. 200, 268) In 
addition to the architectural fees and storage costs described above, the parties disagreed 
as to the amount of property that would be required to be severed from the Gallegos 
parcel an conveyed to Lloyds in order to maximize the value of the Gallegos parcel given 
the setback requirements. The damages therefore included issues as to, the fair market 
value of the property to be severed and conveyed, the taxes that Gallegos had been pying 
thereupon, and an asserted loss of scenic view suffered by Gallegos for the remainder of 
the Gallegos parcel. (Rec. 268) 
On May 2, 2006 - 6 weeks before the scheduled bench trial - Gallegos moved the 
court for permission to amend the Complaint to add an additional claim for punitive 
487233.1 
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damages, alleging thai Mr I load's comu., ? -he encroaching residence A as 
"reckless and was execu \ • : czard ici the property rights of |\jaiiegi,.>,. 
(Amended <L oitiph '* JU. k^c. x3>; On May 31, 200o the triiu ... low t^ i ihi 
amendment and postponed the trial two weeks to Jui n .! 7, H i( H i i P >e 205-206) 
During the trial, Lloyds stipulated h» the dimensions of the encroachment, but 
vigorously defe*^^ . •. \ • -'the damage claims and the new claim for punitive 
da .... -.....- .^ the Find'n^s of Fact am r\ nclusion^ *.* , ,« * ,vere 
responsible for $72,053.31 in total damages to uan*--.. *• — . ''udsmenr and 
Decree consistent therewith, • -, , : d< ^er* na-l:u,jv >ucce<srui in their 
defense by obtaining significant reductions in the amounts of damages sought for 
pro[ «^. including loss of scenic views), architect lees, storage co\f\, mid real 
estate taxes. (Findings f 12, Rec. ? i 4. • :\ _...:* -vr . .. . otelv successful in defeating 
the new claim frr rum
 : v.. ^ti:u^ • .• •: .:-- *; ^ , Rec. 312) Nevertheless, the court 
granted an wa; : ::•• ^ - ! .^es and costs in favor of Appellees Gallegos as additional 
consequents :amaaes and or for Lloyds' bad faith del OHM; piisuani ii • I 't.ih ' 'ode § 78-
27-56(ij. (Conclusion 1? Rec . ^ 
^ r J\ . . _• . liieir Motion for Attorneys Fees (Rec. 28s-J^O; 
3i v x-:;n I/;:-',r ••r?vrt thereof. (Rec. 291 -29° L.iovub oppr- , *.;.*. ; nop h\ 
wr itteii Memorandum filed July 27. 2006. (Kec. .-~o - .. learimi held before 
the trial court on November 2. iju*-. . t\ ;v * ? result of said hearing the court 
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slightly reduced the award, but reaffirmed its basis and the remainder in the Supplemental 
Judgment dated November 15, 2006. (Rec. 370-372) 
Lloyds have filed this appeal from the awards of attorneys fees granted by Judge 
Kennedy in both the July 19, 2007 Judgment and Decree, and the November 15, 2006 
Supplemental Judgment. (Rec. 386-388) 
ARGUMENT 
On July 19, 2006 the trial court entered judgment against Lloyds and generally 
awarded Gallegos damages for the Lloyds' trespass on to the Gallegos' property. The trial 
court also awarded Gallegos their attorney fees either as consequential damages of the 
Lloyds' tort; or, in the alternative, because Lloyds' trespass was found to have been in 
bad faith, and Lloyds' defenses to the Gallegos' claims were found to be without merit 
and asserted in bad faith. There was no contract between the parties that contained any 
agreement to pay attorney fees and the dispute did not involve any breach of contract 
claims. Moreover, Lloyds did not contest the fact of the actual trespass, but disputed only 
the nature and amount of damages claimed by Gallegos. Consequently, Lloyds' appeal is 
directed only to the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
The trial court held that Gallegos were entitled to attorney fees because either the 
fees were part of the consequential damages the Gallegos suffered from the Lloyds' 
trespass; (Findings f 13, at 10, Rec. 314) or, recoverable under Utah Code § 78-27-56 
because Lloyds' defenses to Gallegos' claims were found to be without merit and in bad 
487233.1 
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faith. GeneralK. a >r:al *.ourt mav awar; . when authorized by statute 
or by contract, jt^-a;; -. \ iai i UI-'UL Service Commission. 885 P.2d 7<;(\ "^2 i., .a. 
;
*0 • • -u!" . \Aj avsard fees to the prevailing partv if * ,-,..; «-y 
iction o; ueieii-e w a-i ufonthat is mentlos <md in h;i< ! :" : V (holding that 
at court has the inherent power to award iillurney\ foes to the prevailing partv): Utah 
Code Arr >• > f - Suould overturn the trial court's do.is;w;. - i 
;-^ '> . v**e was no contractor statute authoriz-iiig aUv.niL - \a<;e; 
award of attorney's fee is not appropriate!} i\^ , '•sequential damage :i: a 
ion j . ;Ji*n; and nHT tai ; .x„ : • *• not authorize an award of attorney's fees 
to a pa.rty that has pi evaded m its; asserted defenses to the plaintiffs claims. 
I. ' The Trial Court Erred When it Awarded Gallegos . \ i i .n.« nr \ I eej* as 
Consequential Damages for Their Trespass Claim 
The proper measure • M uamagu- Iri J trespass claim was appropriately, 
correctly, and Ui,,: „ .;-.i.: • < legos and Lloyds in their respective 1 rial Briefs 
submit led *'"» the ~ - *un. i-'o-Ui relying substantially upon the v\cll-e\plaiiied ' .jsf of 
Walker Drug Company. Inc. v. La Sal ml t empa^ ^ N ' ? ^ . 1246 (Utah 1998): 
"Typically, the measure ol damages in liiNpass and nuisance cases involving permanent 
[or indefinite) irijurv lia^ ' been the diminished market value of the property plus 
consequential losses to the use of the land or from discom. T an noyance to the 
possessor." There was, however, no u.xu\> . • d OL attorneys fees as 
487233.1 
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consequential damages in the Walker case or any other Utah reported tort action that 
either Gallegos or Lloyds have been able to discover. 
Gallegos did not include as their prayer for damages in either their Complaint 
(Rec. 1-7) or Amended Complaint (Rec. 210-217) a claim for attorneys fees. Gallegos' 
Trial Brief did contain a itemized schedule of consequential damages requested, with no 
mention of attorney's fees. (Rec. 200) In concluding their Trial Brief, (Rec. 203) 
Gallegos pray for relief to the trial court on the following particulars: 
As a result, [Gallegos] incurred architectural fees, storage charges for 
family heirlooms and furniture and have lost the property, the view and 
have paid taxes on property they can't occupy. These are all legitimate 
damageswhich will be proven and which should be recoverable in this 
case. 
In their Supplemental Trial Brief (Rec. 251-258) submitted following an eleventh-hour 
Order by the trial court allowing Gallegos to amend their Complaint to include a cause 
for punitive damages, Gallegos still failed to request any award of attorneys fees. At no 
time during the trial did Gallegos assert that attorneys fees was an element of 
consequential damages recoverable under their trespass claim. Only at the end of the 
announcement by the Court of his ruling at the end of the trial, did Gallegos even attempt 
to support any such award outside of their unsuccessful prayer for punitive damages. 
(Transcript of Hearing of June 28, 2006, Rec. 397, at page 7, lines 1-19) Even there the 
support proposed by Gallegos was directed to an award pursuant to Utah Code § 78-27-
56, which will be discussed in the next subsequent section. 
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"It is well established in our ., v „., • * " ' t \ cannot be recovered unless 
provided for by statute o - x R Suppl> Company v. Bringhurst. :M 
.ccord, 21 Am. Jur. 2jld § 430 at 4N * i ^ >UPK •*•.: ' • .va& 
1
 -••*'-.iponavoiiuaci There were no contractual attorr*^ • : -*•< provisions stipulated 
between the parties. If there is a legitimate liasis lor the trial court's award of attorney 
fees, it cannot be on ihc basis ul consequential damages. Utah adheres to that well-
esuoLMi- : > the United States, known as " the America.. . . torneyfees 
cannot be recovered by a prevailing partv ui;-.e» J - >ntract authorizes such an 
award . . .." Stewart v. Utan ruoiit- Set vice Commission. 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah . *N : h 
accord Morganroth & Muruanruth - . DeLorean, 21 > F "rd 13^ ; 
(appivmg L 'ttih I\I\VL As recognized by the United States Supreme (Viirl, the reasons for 
the general acceptance of the "America;; K.:C r •* nation is at best uncertain, 
one should no- ue penalizes • lending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and. that the 
poor mign, . -aeed from instituting an action to vindicate iheir n:.»hl\ if 
tin- pc -:' *'T • KIWI included the fees of their opponents' omnscl.1' rieishmann 
Distilling Corp, v. Maier Brewing Co., 3X6 IJ S /1 I 718 (1967). 
An equally well-esldhhslu-d, •-*•' important, corollary to that rule i>;;;... . 
court cannot award attorney's fees to a prevailing party as uw ^ n - ^ - - . i manes of a 
tort "because [legal fees] are not the legitimate . ;*•>.; -,* '-:< iuii . . . . ... pavers 
for Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Amma:^ L.a :-'iata Water Conservancy Dlst.. n7- - - , Jd 
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1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1984); accord Insuranshares Corp. v. N. Fiscal Corp.. 42 F. Supp. 
126, 129 (E.D. Penn. 1941); Winkler et al. v. Roeder. 37 N.W. 607, 608 (Neb. 1888). 
This rule has been consistently applied to trespass and nuisance cases. See, e.g., Wilen v. 
Falkenstein. 191 S.W.2d 791, 804 -^05 (Tex. Civ. App. 2006); Griffin et al. v. Lamberjack. 
644 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (Ohio App. 1996); Harrison v. Textron. Inc.. 328 N.E.2d 838, 846 
(Mass. 1975); Falk v. Waterman. 49 Cal. 224, 225; 1874 WL 1489. 
There are at least two exceptions to this established rule. In adopting Utah Code 
§ 78-18-1, Utah codified the common law exception allowing courts to award attorney 
fees as consequential damages when punitive damages are also awarded. The clear 
purpose of this statutory exception is to punish a party whose malicious conduct required 
the prevailing party to bring a suit. But, where there is no finding of conduct sufficient to 
support the award of punitive damages, there can be no award of attorney fees. In Debry 
& Hilton Travel Services. Inc. v. Capitol International Airways. Inc.. 583 P.2d 1181, 1185 
(Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that where there was no contractual attorney's 
fee provision and where the asserted prayer for punitive damages was denied by the court, 
no attorneys fees would be awarded. See also Dahl v. Prince. 230 P. 2d 328 (Utah 1951). 
Accordingly, this exception will not aid Gallegos in this matter because the trial court 
expressly held that no punitive damages could be awarded to the Gallegos where the 
Gallegos lacked the requisite "clear and convincing evidence that the actions and/or 
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.omissions of the Lloyds were the result ol ^ I'Hul ;»• • < 1 nialicious . . . conduct[.]" (Rec. 
3! 2. Finding or hu,, " s Conclusion of Law f 16) 
:,; i;. • >h courts may also award attorney's fees as coiisctfuenf«;»! ilamages 
• • *-!e natural consequence of one's [tortious conduct | is am iiher's involvement in a 
dispute with a third party/' also known .^ HK; '"third-party tort rule." Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Surety, 8.u * * i ;- •; un 191*3; However, this rule J ^ O 
to fee .•/-«< • • 11' I 11 ic urred in recovering damages from the a c .-••:.:. •*. 
?-'• jj.se the fees requested by Gallegos are limited lit ilu i r incurred in asserting their 
claims against Lloyds, this exception - -plieable to this case. 
Given the mappliciihitilv of both exceptions to the general rule (and ilu: Ln„k oi AIW 
additional exception heretofore asserted by Gallegos), iiu; I.1 s,r! , . h,;ii , irat'h erred as a 
matter of law in awarding Gallegos their attorney's io> »•• consequential damages. Any 
holding to the contrary '"would i.misi ••' - substantial abridgment of the American ru.c, 
to winch Utah umrK have | until now] demonstrated strong allegiance." Moduli; win -A 
Morganroth. 3 i3 13a at 13 1 ti. 
The Trial Court Erred when it Concluded that the Lloyds' Defenses to 
the Gallegos' Claim for Damages Were Without Merit and in Bad 
Faith. 
Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code allows a coun .:• , •<• : .. ... . i *:i*. aro^cVs 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines "Liu *t • u oi uetense k me auion 
was without merit and noi broughl in good faith n Gallegos originally brought their 
487233.1 
action against Lloyds and others on claims of trespass and quiet title. At the time of their 
receipt of service of the Complaint, Lloyds had not yet verified the actuality of the alleged 
trespass. Very early in the litigation discovery proceedings, Lloyds did discover and 
affirmatively admit to Gallegos that a trespass had occurred. (Gallegos Trial Brief at 3, 
Rec. 200) No contest or affirmative defense was ever made by Lloyds to that assertion. 
The entire pre-trial litigation was directed to the appropriate measure of damages to be 
paid to Gallegos as caused by said trespass. On May 2, 2006, at the eleventh hour before 
the trial then scheduled for June 13, 2006, Gallegos filed a motion to amend their 
Complaint to quantify their damages in the amount of $127,999.36, and assert a new 
additional claim for punitive damages. (Motion to Amend, Rec. 131-140) Although 
contested by Defendants Lloyd, (Memorandum in Opposition, Rec. 155-160) said Motion 
was granted. The trial was rescheduled for June 27, 2006. Lloyds answered the 
Amended Complaint formally admitting the trespass. (Answer to Amended Complaint, 
Rec. 261 at f 7) Substantial pretrial and trial time and energy was thereupon expended by 
both parties to the issue of whether Lloyds had acted "in willful disregard of the property 
rights of others." Additional witnesses were required and documents prepared. 
At the close of trial, the Court made specific findings concerning the each of the 
elements of damage claimed by Gallegos as well as the nature of Lloyds conduct which 
caused said damages. The Court found total damages in the amount of $72,053.31. 
(Judgment, Rec. 318 at f 1) Although in excess of the $10,000.00 amount acknowledged 
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iii Lloyds' Trial Brief, (Rec. 269) the aw aided .miuiini was significantly reduced from the 
amount plead m o^.eu* - ^ \ • v imolaint and Trial Brief (Rec. 200) because of 
eviaerv-.
 ; ' - • " md defense arguments made b> T -ryds at f ;. .^ ?- - •' i of 
• - iss^sed damages was a direct result of'the increased -i»/e * r ^hce oi prop^ny -o be 
conveyed by Gallegos to Lloyds.. I In- < ourt further found that it could not find r- .^m-
i'xl r~nvi neing e* : .. * is had acted willfully, maliciously, or in an 
..-J • •• tV'Muttiieiu maimer, or with a knowing and iock.j^^ u >iv^ :• *"'* rvjhts 
jifreis/* (Rec. _; i 2. Finding of Fm i * ; . .m-.. - • fusion of Law |^ 16) 
The trial court's award .3 ; *• ''. v- under Section ""8-27-56, should be 
reversed because • i M • In il i i-mt misconstrued 'the statute when it concluded lluil Lloyds' 
cieuv.-.-- -. ;-v i ;allei?os demand for damages were \\ L, .. i sued in good 
faith, under Section 78-27-56. \IK .;.,,. ..- • - • *' ^ -ney's fees "whe*: the court 
determines that the , , . cLj^ •: - * wao vwL~eu merit and [2] [was] not 
brought in good laiih[ | I> •* phasis added;. ! his Cow* shru.i; reverse :A - * : « 
attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 because; (I I th; diiensr u» Ofillegos' claim for 
damages u as :vi u Ithout mern - J ,. hat the Lloyds fully or substantially 
succeeded u\ ;^u: ,:eV"> * the trial eom. based its determination ti\„ . • .> 
:;.- ' - : on Lloyds" pre-lingatlo': ci'-nduct rather m.; ; . * * • • 
'•^••?a:;on. 
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A, Lloyds' Defenses Were Not Meritless Given the Trial Court's Dismissal 
of the Claim for Fraud and Substantial Reduction of Gallegos5 Damage 
Claims, 
Lloyds' asserted defenses cannot be deemed meritless in light of the fact that the 
trial court reduced the amount of actual damages claimed by Gallegos by more than forty 
percent and completely dismissed the Gallegos' claim for punitive damages. Under the 
provisions of section 78-27-56(1), a trial court cannot award attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party unless the losing party's claims or defenses were "without merit." While 
the question of bad faith may be a question of fact,"[w]hether a defense is without merit 
is a question of law, which can be determined on appeal." Broadwater v. Old Republic 
Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 534, n.3 (Utah 1993). A claim or defense is without merit if it is 
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. 
DMG Color. Inc., 2000 UT at f 22, 20 P.3d at 874 (quoting Cadv v. Johnson . 671 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis added). However, an asserted claim or defense cannot 
be meritless or "frivolous" if, after asserting that claim or defense, the party prevails, even 
partially. Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App. at f 19r 122 P.3d at 149. 
Moreover, defenses asserted against a plaintiffs claim for damages are not frivolous if 
there is a factual basis for the defense in the record. See kL at 534. Thus, the Lloyds' 
defenses of Gallegos' claims for actual and punitive damages are not "without merit" for 
two reasons: (1) the Lloyds' prevailed in whole or part on their defenses; and (2) those 
defenses were based on facts in the record. Gallegos have not appealed either the 
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dismissal of the punitive damage or the significant devaluation of their damage claim on 
the trespass. 
When a party asserts a defense and prevails - even if only partially - as a matter of 
law the asserted defense cannot be considered frivolous. In Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen-
Adams, 2005 UT at f 19, 122 P.3d at 149, this Court interpreted a rule from the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure that is very similar to the "without merit" provision of 
section 78-27-56. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for the 
award of attorney's fees if an appellate court determines that an appeal is frivolous. Utah 
R. App. P. 33. Having prevailed in the trial court and on appeal, the prevailing party 
requested fees under Rule 33. In construing that rule, this Court held that the prevailing 
party was not entitled to fees because the losing party's appeal could not be considered 
"frivolous" for purposes of Rule 33 in as much as that party had partially prevailed on 
appeal. 
Similarly, the trial court erred when it concluded that Lloyds' defenses were 
without merit or were frivolous. Lloyds partially prevailed against the Gallegos' claim 
for actual damages and completely prevailed against Gallegos' claim for punitive 
damages. The following table compares the parties' competing pre-trial claims with the 
actual award by the trial court: 
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Damage Item Gallegos' Claim1 Court Finding2 Lloyd Admission3 
Value of Property $3 3,224.00 
Value of Lost View $ 19,176.00 
Architecture Fees $65,971.65 
Storage Fees $6,816.00 
Real Estate Taxes $2,811.71 
TOTAL $127,999.36 
$27,500.00 
$0 
$39,500.00 
$2,300.00 
$2,753.31 
$72,053.31 
$4,607.00 
$0 
$5,000.00 
$0 
$1,000.00 
$10,607.00 
Clearly, Lloyds' defenses were not without merit, as they were successful in (1) reducing 
Plaintiffs' liquidated claims by 43%, and (2) eliminating entirely Plaintiffs' claim for 
punitive damages. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rec. 305-316; (312, f 30 
and 315, f 16)) "No award of punitive damages should be made in this matter." Thus, 
according to the reasoning of Mi Vida Enterprises v. Steen- Adams, 2005 UT App. at f 
19, 122, P.3d at 149, by even partially prevailing against Gallegos5 actual damages claim, 
and by completely prevailing against Gallegos' claim for punitive damages, a reversal of 
the trial court's award of fees is required. 
1
 Data extracted from Amended Complaint (Rec. 137-1380) and Gallegos' Trial 
Brief. (Rec. at 200) 
2
 Data extracted from Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Rec. 311, |^ 26) 
3
 Data extracted from Lloyds' Trial Brief. (Rec. at 269) 
20 
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B. The Trial Court's Award of Attorneys Fees Was Based Entirely On Its 
Finding of Bad Faith in Lloyds' Pre-litigation Conduct 
The trial court misconstrued section 78-27-56 to exclusively punish Lloyds' pre-
litigation conduct. Before a trial court can award the prevailing party attorney fees, that 
court must find that the losing party acted in bad faith within the litigation, to wit: "not 
brought or asserted in good faith." In determining whether a party acted in bad faith for 
purposes of section 78-27-56, the statute limits the scope of relevant conduct to a party's 
"action or defense." In other words, for purposes of section 78-27-56, when determining 
whether a party acted in bad faith, the only relevant conduct for consideration is a party's 
conduct during litigation. In Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, f 13, 122 
P.3d 556, 560, the Utah Supreme Court refused to award attorney fees under section 78-
27-56 because the party lacked "the subjective intent to bring this action in bad faith" 
(emphasis added). The Court in Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon. 2002 UT 
99, f 29, 61 P.3d 1009, 1018 awarded fees under section 78-27-56 where plaintiff 
"lacked an honest belief in the propriety of bringing a suit" (emphasis added). In Warner 
v. DMG Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 102, at \ 23, the Court affirmed an award of attorneys fees 
under section 78-27-56 because "plaintiff acted in bad faith in pursuing his action" 
(emphasis added). In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the Court 
similarly affirmed an award of attorneys fees under section 78-27-56 because plaintiffs 
"pursued their claims" in bad faith (emphasis added). In the current matter, the trial court 
made no findings as to the conduct of Lloyds within the litigation other than stating that it 
21 
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found Mr. Lloyd's testimony "not credible." (Finding |14 at Rec. 308-09, and f 29 at 
Rec, 312) In virtually every litigation there will be a requirement that the court find one 
version of the facts as given by one side more credible than the other. That finding has 
never been held sufficient by itself to uphold an award of attorneys fees under Section 78-
27-56. 
While there are no Utah cases that expressly hold that section 78-27-56 does not 
permit a court to consider prelitigation conduct when determining whether a party acted 
in bad faith, that is the directive of the statute's plain language and structure. Section 78-
27-56 provides that "the court shall award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1). Thus, according to 
the plain language of the statute, the bad faith requirement is linked to the phrase "action 
or defense" by the conjunction "and," thereby indicating the Legislature's intent to limit 
instances of bad faith to conduct linked to an "action or defense." 
Moreover, taken structurally, section 78-27-56 indicates that the bad faith 
provision is limited to instances of bad faith during litigation given that all terms 
preceding the bad faith provision have already been interpreted to refer exclusively to 
litigation. As construed in Chipman v. Miller. 943 P.2d 1158, 1161-62 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), the term "action or defense" is limited to instances where a party asserts a legal 
action (whether a claim or a motion), or a defense to a legal action. Moreover, whether 
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conduct is "without merit" (the statutory term immediately preceding the bad faith 
provision), is traceable only to a party's legal action or defense, and not to prelitigation 
conduct. Thus, to conclude that the determination of whether an action or defense was 
"not brought or asserted in good faith" somehow extends to pre-litigation conduct -
despite the fact that all prior elements of the statute relate exclusively to conduct during 
litigation - would belie the structure and meaning of the entire statute. 
Consequently, the trial court misconstrued section 78-27-56 when it relied on the 
Lloyds prelitigation conduct to find that Lloyds acted in bad faith. As stated in the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the sole basis for awarding the Gallegos 
attorney fees was the Lloyds prelitigation conduct. The trial court decided to award the 
Gallegos fees: because "the Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their 
actions and ultimately took advantage of Plaintiffs 'property rights of which [the Lloyds] 
knew or should have known" (Trial Ct. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law f 29, at 
8); "based on documentary evidence and witness testimony presented at trial," id. at f 13, 
at 10. However, taking advantage of the Gallegos property rights (presumably through 
trespass) is not conduct related to the litigation; and none of the documents or witnesses 
presented at trial established in any way that the Lloyds acted in bad faith during the 
litigation. Indeed, the sole purpose of the documentary evidence and witness testimony 
introduced at trial was to prove that the Lloyds pre-litigation conduct was sufficiently 
wanton and willful to warrant an award of punitive damages, not attorney fees. That fact 
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is especially obvious given that the decision to award attorney fees to the Gallegos was 
made after trial ended; and during the course of those proceedings, neither the Gallegos 
nor the trial court established a single instance when the Lloyds acted in bad faith during 
the litigation. 
While at least one Utah appeals court has affirmed an award of attorneys fees 
based on pre-litigation bad-faith conduct, it did so only in the area of contract. Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) 
The 10th Circuit Court in Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301, 
1318 (200), while determining whether a federal trial court had the inherent authority to 
award attorneys fees for bad-faith conduct, did declare that "Utah likely would agree with 
the weight of federal authority" limiting its consideration of "bad faith" conduct within 
the litigation, "rather than substantially abridge American Rule by permitting its courts to 
award attorney's fees for bad conduct not related to the litigation process itself." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award of attorney fees is not supportable by either of its twin 
rationales, whether as consequential damages or under Utah Code § 78-27-56. First, 
where there is no statute or contract providing otherwise, attorney fees cannot be party of 
an award for consequential damages. Neither statute nor contract is available to the 
Gallegos to make such a claim in this case. Second, as a matter of law, Utah Code § 78-
27-56 cannot provide a basis for the award of fees. Lloyds' defenses to the Gallegos 
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action for actual and punitive damages were not without merit because the Lloyds fully or 
partially prevailed on all of those defenses. Finally, the trial court misinterpreted the bad-
faith provision of Utah Code § 78-27-56 and relied almost entirely upon prelitigation 
conduct, even though the statute's plain language indicates otherwise. Accordingly, 
Lloyds respectfully request that the trial court's decision to award the Gallegos attorneys' 
fees on both the Judgment and Decree and the Supplemental Judgment be reversed. 
DATED: April 30, 2007 CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James and Julie Lloyd 
487233 1 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of this APPELLANTS' BRIEF was served by United 
States mail, first class postage prepaid, on the 30th day of April, 2007, on the following: 
George A. Hunt 
Stephen T. Hester 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Plat Map Showing Encroachment 
GALLEGOS PROPERTY 
rovuo E.W.P. 
REBAR * C*P 
IS #8190 BASIS OF BEARINGS 
N01'09'18"W 
16S.00' O'ER EMIGRATION OAKS PH 3) 
164.97' («*EAS) 
- L = 4 0 . 9 8 ' 
R = 525 .00 ' 
A - 4 ' 2 8 ' 1 9 
IT 100 
LOT 102 
O 
\ 
\ 
L=131 .69 ' 
R = 275 .00 ' 
A = 27 '26 '14 ' ! 
\ 
L=134 .48 ' 
R = 200.00 ' 
A = 3 8 ' 3 r 3 5 " 
\ 
L = 2 3 . 6 T 
R=15.00 ' 
A = 90*09'54" 
FRE1ZE.CREEK_C!RCLE. 
(A PWvME STREET) 
A 
v 
SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE: 
I. MART* W. SHEARER. DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ! AM A REGISTERED LAND | 
SURVEYOR HOLDING CERTIFICATE +948 AS PRESCRI8E0 BY THE LAWS Of 
THE THE STATE OF UTAH. I FURTHER CERTrr THAT 1 HAVE SUPERVISED A 
SURVEY OF THE TRACT OF LAND SHOWN, AND THAT THE SURVEY OF SAID 
TRACT OF UNO IS ACCURATELY REPRESENTED HEREON. 
BOUNOARY DESCRIPTION: 
ALL OF LOT 1 
NO. 5407643, 
LAKE COUNTY 
!. EMIGRATION OAKS P.U.O. 
NARRATIVE OF BOUNDARY: 
FROM THE REBAR AND CAPS SHOWN HEREON. THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS 
ESTABLISHED ON THE GROUND PER THE EMIGRATION OAKS P.U.D. PHASE 3 
MAP, RECORDED AS ENTRY NO. 5407643, IN BOOK 9 3 - ! . AT PAGE 1. IN 
THE OFFICE OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER. 
BASIS OF BEARINGS: 
THE BASIS OF BEAR1NCS FOR THIS SURVEY 13 NORTH 0 r 0 9 ' 1 8 " EAST 
BETWEEN A REBAR ANO CAP FOUND MARKING THE SOUTHEAST CORNER C 
LOT 100. ANO A REBAR AND CAP FOUND MARKING THE NORTHEAST CORNER 
OF LOT 100, OF EMIGRATION OAKS P.U.D. F"~ 3 SHOWN HEREON 
GENERAL NOTES: 
( I ) DOCUMENTS OF ADJOINING PROPERTIES OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT 
FURNISHED BY CLIENT HAVE NOT BEEN USED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS 
SURVEY. THEREFORE, ISSUES THAT MAY EXIST REGARDING GAPS OR 
OVERLAPS Of DESCRIPTIONS AND OUESTIONS AS TO UNDERLYING FEE 
OWNERSHIP, JUNIOR ANO SENIOR RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP PERTAINING TO 
ADJOINING PROPERTIES. ARE NOT ADDRESSED ON OR BY THIS MAP. THE 
INFLUENCE OF OTHER DOCUMENTS COULD RESULT IN THE VARIANCE OF 
PROPERTY LINES AS SHOWN HEREON. 
TABLE OF ENCROACHMENTS AND ADJACENT STRUCTURES: 
^ j ) FOUND REBAR AND CAP BEARS S6CTE 0.2' 
@) FOUND REBAR AND CAP BEARS S62E 0.3' 
t03^ FOUND REBAR AND CAP BEARS S49W 0.2' 
^ TREE IS 38' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
^ GARAGE CORNER IS 2.8' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
^ } SIDEWALK CORNER IS 8.4' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
^ TREE IS 36 ' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
^ 8 ) SOEWALK IS AT PROPERTY LINE 
@) SIOEWALK IS 3.5" OUTSIDE OF PROPERTY 
Y°) EDGE OF GRASS IS 3 2 ' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
Q) PORCH OVERHANG IS 6.8' INSIOE OF PROPERTY 
$ _ y HOUSE CORNER IS 4.0' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
$$} WINDOW WELL IS S.O' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
$*} EDGE OF GRASS IS 28' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
tfs} WINDOW WELL IS 1 4 ' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
® TREE IS 2 5 ' INSIOE OF PROPERTY 
<£?) EDGE OF GRASS IS AT PROPERTY LINE 
V2? ''REE IS 10' INSIDE OF PROPERTY 
Q>) FOUND REBAR AND CAP BEARS Sl6'W 0 1' 
^ FOUND REBAR AND CAP AT PROPERTY CORNER 
EXHIBIT 
SCALE: 1H = 20' Stanley Consultants INC. 
GALLEGOS PROPERTY 
RECORD 
LOCATED IN THE SOUTHWEST OUARTER I 
OF SECTION 28. TOWNSHIP } NORTH. 
RANGE 2 EAST. SALT LAKE BASE AND' MERIDIANX 
ux>" ADDENDUM "B 
Ruling June 28,2006 
on Motion on Attorney's Fees 
(Pages 1 and 7) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW GALLEGOS, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES LLOYD, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 040916534 PR 
Appellate Case 20061135-SC 
With Keyword Index 
June 28,2006 
November 2,2006 
RULING ONLY 
MOTION ON ATTORNEY'S FEES 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Page 1 
PILED GtSTHiS? COURT 
Third Judicial District 
nJzLZ 
JAN 3 ! 2007 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JUNE 28, 2006 
2 JUDGE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 ^PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY* 
6 P R O C E E D I N G S 
7 THE COURT: Well, I think as our discussion focused 
8 here, the problem appears to be that no one seems to be able 
9 to say how long the process of being able to get a building 
10 permit would have taken. The testimony was that Gallegoses 
11 were under some sort of unique family pressures that prompted 
12 them to need to act. I find that their decision to buy a new 
13 lot and proceed with the house on that location, on Location 
14 14, was a reasonable decision given the facts. 
15 I find also that Mr. Lloyd was certainly negligent 
16 in going forward with the construction on his home in the 
17 location in which it was ultimately situated which I find in 
18 violation of the approved site plan. 
19 I find that if the lot were, in fact, staked as it 
20 was built, it was not reasonable for him to rely on that 
21 staking. There were too many other indications to indicate 
22 that it was correct. I would find that he either knew or 
23 should have known that the house was in the wrong place but 
24 he proceeded anyway. 
25 I find that he - that motivations existed to build 
1 MR. HUNT: Got a question, Your Honor. The award of 
2 attorney's fees and you're calling that consequential 
3 damages, not either allowed by statute or by contract, but 
4 just as consequential damages; is that what I understand? 
5 THE COURT: Well, I guess I have two choices. I 
6 guess I could find punitive, a need for punitive damages here 
7 and award them in that context, or I could put them in as 
8 consequential damages on the other hand and it would seem to 
9 me to be, it would save further hearing on a punitive damage 
10 award. As I say, by the slimmest of margin, I have not 
11 awarded punitive damages here, but I think consequential 
12 damages are appropriate. 
13 MR. HUNT: Your Honor, if I may speak to that. I 
14 think also the Court has the latitude to find that the 
15 position advanced by the Lloyds in defense of the client is 
16 not credible and that gives the Court latitude under 78-27-
17 56. 
18 THE COURT: Well, and I would - I would so find 
19 that. I think that that's - warrant that. 
20 MR. HUNT: We can submit that by motion and 
21 affidavit in dealing with the amount or-
22 THE COURT: Again, have Mr. Davis look that over 
23 carefully. 
24 MR. HUNT: Sure. 
25 THE COURT: Anything further? 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 040916534 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court on June 2Th 
and 28 th, 2006, with die Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding without a 
jury. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, George A. Hunt and 
Stephen T. Hester of Williams & Hunt. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd were present 
and represented by their counsel, T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough. 
Defendant Mountain America Federal Credit Union was present and represented by its 
counsel William G. Wilson of Scalley & Reading, and Defendant Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel, Darren K. Nelson of Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown & Gee. Witnesses were sworn and counsel elicited testimony from the 
witnesses, presented documentary exhibits and argued their respective positions to the 
Court. The parties then submitted the case for decision and the Court issued a ruling from 
the bench at the close of trial. Consistent with that ruling and in support thereof, the Court 
now enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs, Andrew and Joan Gailegos (the "Gallegos"5) are record owners 
of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically described as 
Lot 102 Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase in , Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 102"). 
2. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd (the "Lloyds") are the record owners and 
residents of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically 
described as Lot 106 Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V, commonly known as 5982 
Pioneer Fork Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 106"). 
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3. Defendant Mountain American Federal Credit Union ("Mountain America") 
is a Utah non-profit corporation and a federally chartered credit union with its principal 
place of business in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") is a 
Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, Utah and is acting as 
nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York corporation, dba America's 
Wholesale Lender ("Countrywide35). 
5. Lots 102 and 106 share a common property line. The common property line 
is situated on top of a ridge. 
6. In 1993, the Gallegos purchased Lot 102 of the Emigration Oaks 
Subdivision, Phase III, in order to build their dream home sometime in the future. 
7. In June of 1996, Defendants James and Julie Lloyd purchased Lot 106 of the 
Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V. The topography of Lot 106 was a slope elevating 
from the east property line up to the west property line shared with Lot 102. 
8. In an effort to improve Lot 106, the Lloyds engaged the services of Mr. 
James Carroll to provide architectural drawings of a home to be built on Lot 106. 
9. Mr. Carroll provided detailed drawings of the Lloyds future home, including 
a site plan, to the Lloyds and submitted the drawings and site plan to Salt Lake County to 
gain approval to begin construction on Lot 106 (the "Lot 106 Site Plan"). Mr. Carroll 
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denies inspecting the construction of the Lloyd Home to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, although he visited the property five or six times 
during construction. 
10. No evidence was presented regarding whether Defendants Mountain America 
and Countrywide (who hold deeds of trust against Lot 106) inspected the construction of 
the Lloyd home to ensure compliance with the Lot 106 Site Plan, nor was any argument 
made that they had a duty to do so. 
11. Salt Lake County approved the Lot 106 Site Plan in or about August 1996 
and the Lloyds began construction of their home (the "Lloyd Home") immediately 
thereafter. 
12. Mr. Lloyd acted as the general contractor overseeing the construction of the 
Lloyd Home. Mrs. Lloyd assisted Mr. Lloyd in his duties as general contractor by 
reviewing and paying invoices of subcontractors. 
13. The Lloyd Home was neither staked nor constructed according to the 
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. The Lloyd Home was staked on Let 106 in such a 
way that a portion of the home was built upon, and in fact encroached upon, Lot 102. 
14. The Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact that the construction 
of their home was not proceeding according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they 
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot 102, is not credible. Likewise, the 
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Lloyd's assertion that they relied upon other professionals to properly stake theire home or 
notify them that their home was not located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not 
credible. 
15. There were several physical markers required by the Lot 106 Site Plan which 
never materialized during the construction of the Lloyd's home. These markers included: 
1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home; 
2) the presence of two large retaining walls on both the west and east side of the driveway; 
and 3) an average grade on the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%. The 
absence of these markers provided unmistakable notice to the Lloyd's that their home was 
being constructed in the wrong location. 
16. The Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the construction of their 
home as staked because the Lloyds knew, or should have known, that the staking and 
subsequent construction of their home violated the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
17. The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan to their 
considerable advantage. 
18. Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements of the Lot 106 Site 
Plan. This motive included: 1) avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the 
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an improved view with southern exposure; 
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and 3) constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the average 8.5% slope 
contemplated by the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
19. In July 1997, the Lloyds finished construction of their home on Lot 106. As 
a result of the Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the home encroached upon Lot 102, well 
beyond the minimal set back and side yard requirements required by the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
20. In disregarding the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Lloyds 
intended to build their home in such a way that resulted in the unlawful invasion of the 
Gailegos' property. 
21. As a result of the Lloyds5 disregard for the requirements of the Lot 106 Site 
Plan, the Lloyd Home is fifteen feet higher in elevation than contemplated by the Lot 106 
Site Plan and sits laterally over forty feet west of its designated location. 
22. The ultimate siting of the Lloyd Home interfered with the Gailegos' view 
from Lot 102. 
23. As a result of the Lloyds5 encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gailegos were 
unable to build a home on Lot 102 pursuant to architectural designs they had previously 
developed and purchased. 
24. As a further result of the Lloyds' encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gailegos 
were unable to determine when they would be able to obtain a building permit for Lot 102 
and commence construction. Due to the indeterminable delay in commencing construction 
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on Lot 102, the Gailegos purchased Lot 14 in Phase I of the Emigration Oaks Subdivision 
and proceeded with a new home design. 
25. As a direct consequence of Mr. Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the Gailegos 
incurred architectural and storage fees that they would not have otherwise incurred, and 
paid taxes on property being occupied and utilized by the Lloyds. 
26. The amount of the damages suffered by the Gailegos as a direct consequence 
of the trespass of the Lloyds, are as follows: 
Architectural Fees $39,500.00 
Taxes 2,753.31 
Storage Fees 2,300.00 
Lost Property Value 27,500.00 
TOTAL $72,053.31 
27. The encroachment and damages for taxes will continue until the boundary 
can be adjusted and approved by the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association and any 
and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. The correct approach to 
adjustment is the approach suggested by the Gailegos5 expert witness, Mr. Jerry Webber, 
viz., transfer a 38 foot wide strip along Lot 102's eastern boundary to the Lloyds in 
consideration of the $27,500 in damages noted in 11 25, above. Such adjustment will 
require the services of a licensed surveyor and the Lloyds should pay all such costs, together 
with any and all fees and other costs associated with adjusting the respective property 
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boundaries and obtaining approval from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association 
and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. 
28. Moving or demolishing the Lloyd home would involve economic waste and 
therefore the boundary adjustment mechanism described above is the most equitable 
method of resolving the encroachment. 
29. As a direct consequence of the actions and/or omissions of the Lloyds, the 
Gallegos were required to obtain counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the 
boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render Lot 102 usable and 
marketable. The Lloyds initiated no action to address or resolve their trespass. In addition, 
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of this action. In particular, the 
Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately, took 
advantage of Plaintiffs' property rights of which they knew or should have known. Their 
defense to the Gallegos5 claims was without merit. The amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees 
incurred should be established by motion pursuant to Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
30. The Court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the actions 
and/or omissions of the Lloyds were the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward 
the rights of the Gallegos. 
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FROM THE foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter 
jurisdiction over this action. 
2. Venue is properly laid in this District. 
3. The Gallegos were, at all relevant times, in actual possession of Lot 102. 
4. The Lloyds trespassed on to Lot 102 by causing their home to be built in 
such a fashion and location that it encroaches on Lot 102. 
5. Acting as the general contractor in building his own home, Mr. Lloyd owed 
the Gallegos a duty to situate the location of his home with reasonable care and to ensure 
that his home was constructed according to the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
6. Mr. Lloyd breached that duty by staking the Lloyd Home in such a way as to 
cause the home to be situated and constructed so that it encroached upon Lot 102. 
7. The Lloyd's knew or should have known that their home was not staked or 
constructed according to the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan but proceeded with 
construction anyway. 
8. It was foreseeable that, as a result of Mr. Lloyd's breach of his duty to 
properly stake his home and ensure that it was constructed according to the requirements of 
the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Gallegos would suffer damages. 
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9. The Lloyd's actions and/or omissions caused the Gallegos to be damaged. 
10. Mr. Lloyd acted unreasonably in proceeding with construction of the Lloyd 
Home in violation of the Lot 106 Site Plan. 
11. It was reasonable for the Gallegos to pursue the design and construction of a 
new home on Lot 14 in the Emigration Oaks Subdivision as a result of the Lloyds5 
encroachment on Lot 102. 
12. As a result of the Lloyds' encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos should 
recover damages consisting of: 1) architectural fees in the amount of $39,500.00; 2) taxes 
paid on Lot 102 in the amount of $2,753.31 and continuing until property boundary is re-
drawn; 3) storage fees of $2,300.00; and 4) diminution in value of Lot 102 in the amount 
of $27,500.00. 
13. As a further result of the Lloyds' encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos 
suffered consequential damages in the form of attorney's fees which should be recovered. In 
addition, based on the documentary evidence and witness testimony presented at trial, the 
Lloyds' defense of this action was without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
Accordingly, attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56, the amount to be established by motion under Rules 54 and 73 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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14. As a further result of the Lloyds3 encroachment on to Lot 102, the property 
boundary between Lot 102 and Lot 106 must be re-drawn in accordance with die expert 
report of Mr. Jerry Webber. The new property boundary should run parallel with the 
existing property boundary and should include approximately 7,800 square feet of Lot 102. 
In the event that the property added by the boundary adjustment contains any scrub oak, 
the conveyance should provide a perpetual easement encompassing that scrub oak thereby 
preventing its destruction and/or removal. 
15. The fees and costs associated with preparing the new property boundary and 
obtaining approval of the new property boundary from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners 
Association and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters, should be 
paid by the Lloyds. 
16. No award of punitive damages should be made in this matter. 
17. Defendants Mountain America and Countrywide are not culpable in this 
matter and are not responsible for any of the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, 
they should be dismissed from this action. 
18. The Court should retain jurisdiction over this matter until the property 
boundary adjustment is completed and all costs and fees associated therewith have been paid 
in fall. 
19. The Court should enter a Judgment and Decree consistent herewith. 
11 
DATED this JfL day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WILLIAM G. WILSON 
(JVA 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF XJTAH 
ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN 
GALLEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD; 
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE 
HOME LOANS, INC., a New York corporation, 
dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER; J. 
SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee; and CAREY 
JOHANSEN dba LAND DESIGN, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Case No. 040916534 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
This matter came on regularly for trial bef(5re ^ above-entitled Court on June 27th 
and 28 th, 2006, with the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding without a 
jury. Plaintiffs were present and represented by tfieir counsel, George A. Hunt and 
Stephen T. Hester of Williams & Hunt. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd were present 
JudCjiramt anri Decree (S)J 
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and represented by their counsel, T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough. 
Defendant Mountain America Federal Credit Union was present and represented by its 
counsel William G. Wilson of Scalley & Reading and Defendant Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel, Darren K. Nelson of Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown & Gee. Witnesses were sworn and counsel elicited testimony from the 
witnesses, presented documentary exhibits and argued their respective positions to the 
Court. The parties then submitted the case for decision and the Court issued a ruling from 
the bench at the close of trial. Thereafter, this Court entered its formal Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Consistent with the foregoing, and good cause appearing 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs Andrew and Joan Gallegos have a money judgment in their favor 
and against Defendants James and Julie Lloyd, and each of them, in the amount of 
$72,053.31, together with costs of court and attorney's fees to be determined by the Court 
pursuant to Rules 54 and 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd shall proceed forthwith to effect a 
boundary adjustment between Lot 106, Phase V, Emigration Oaks Subdivision and Lot 
102, Phase III, Emigration Oaks Subdivision, whereby a 38f strip of land running parallel 
from the Eastern line of Lot 102 shall be surveyed, staked and conveyed by Plaintiffs to 
Defendants James and Julie Lloyd, said conveyance to be made upon payment of the money 
judgment set forth in 111, above. In the event that the property added by the boundary 
adjustment contains any scrub oak, the conveyance shall provide a perpetual easement 
encompassing that scrub oak thereby preventing its destruction and/or removal. Also, 
Defendants James and Julie Lloyd shall pay all fees and costs associated with a) preparing 
the new property boundary between Lots 102 and Lot 106, and b) obtaining approval of 
the new property boundary from the Emigration Oaks Homeowner's Association as well as 
any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. 
3. The claims against Defendants Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and 
Mountain America Credit Union are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter pending completion of the 
boundary adjustment process set forth in If 2, above. 
DATED this J ( f d a y of July, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/fOH>) PAUL KB^NEI^Y / 
( Distri/t Court Judge 
WILLIAM G. WILSON 
DARREN K. NELSON 129476 1 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN 
GALLEGOS, 
Plaintiffs, 
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD; 
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation; 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC, a Delaware 
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE 
HOME LOANS, INC, a New York 
corporation, dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE 
LENDER; J. SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee; 
and CAREY JOHANSEN dba LAND 
DESIGN, 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES & COSTS 
Case No. 040916534 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
The Motion of Plaintiffs for Attorneys Fees and Establishment of Costs in this 
matter came on regularly for hearing before die above entided court on November 2, 
Supplemental Judgment for Attorneys Fees & Costs @ 
JD20801003 
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2006 at 8:30 a.m., the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding. George A. Hunt of 
Williams & Hunt appeared for Plaintiffs, and T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & 
McCullough appeared for Defendants James and Julie Lloyd. The Court, after having 
reviewed the various Memoranda filed by the parties, and having heard argument of 
counsel and having noted the absence of any opposing affidavits or Rule 59(e) or Rule 
54(d)(2) motions from Defendants, and having fully considered the positions of the 
parties, and finding the requested fees and costs to be reasonable in amount and necessarily 
incurred, except as adjusted herein, and good cause appearing, NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the motion 
of Plaintiffs shall be and is hereby granted and Plaintiffs shall have Supplemental 
Judgement against Defendants James and Julie Lloyd, and each of them, in the following 
amounts: 
1. Attorneys fees of $56,798.00, said amount representing a 10% discount to 
the amount claimed and requested by Plaintiffs; and 
2. Costs of $ 9,398.17, said amount representing a discount of $1,398.16 from 
the amount of costs claimed and requested by Plaintiffs, for a total aggregate Supplemental 
Judgment amount of $66,196.17. 
DATED this j (-> . day of November, 2006. 
BY THE COURT/ j/&°l^. ^J 
\f (X<?<T^J^ 
JOH^HVL/L KENNEDY
 x 
District! Court Judge ' x-
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